

Design for Security

Serena Chen | @Sereena | O'Reilly Velocity 2018





Usability



Security

**Good user experience
design and good security
cannot exist without each
other**

**Everyone deserves to be
secure without being
experts**

**We need to stop expecting
people to become security
experts**

“I don’t care about security.”

–Everyone not watching Mr Robot right now

“Given a choice between dancing pigs and security, the user will pick dancing pigs every time.”

*–MCGRAW, G., FELTEN, E., AND MACMICHAEL, R.
Securing Java: getting down to business with mobile code. Wiley Computer Pub., 1999*

CATS
“Given a choice between ~~dancing pigs~~
and security, the user will pick ~~dancing~~
CATS ~~pigs~~ every time.”

–Serena Chen, not allowed pets in her apartment

A scene from a movie showing a woman in a black coat talking to a man in a red jacket, with other people in the background.

Shame! Shame! Shame! Bad vampire! Shame!



Tweets 189 Followers 18.8K

Follow

Debit Card

Please quit posting pictures of your debit cards, people.

Joined May 2012

Photos and videos



New to Twitter?

Sign up now to get your own personalized timeline!

Sign up

Tweets Tweets & replies Media

Debit Card Retweeted

[redacted] just got a new credit card 🥳🥳



QDB: Quote #244321 serena

← → ↻ bash.org/?244321 🔍 ☆ ⋮

QDB **Quote #244321**

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
#244321 + (39062) - [X]

<Cthon98> hey, if you type in your pw, it will show as stars
<Cthon98> ***** see!
<AzureDiamond> hunter2
<AzureDiamond> doesnt look like stars to me
<Cthon98> <AzureDiamond> *****
<Cthon98> thats what I see
<AzureDiamond> oh, really?
<Cthon98> Absolutely
<AzureDiamond> you can go hunter2 my hunter2-ing hunter2
<AzureDiamond> haha, does that look funny to you?
<Cthon98> lol, yes. See, when YOU type hunter2, it shows to us as *****
<AzureDiamond> thats neat, I didnt know IRC did that
<Cthon98> yep, no matter how many times you type hunter2, it will show to us as *****
<AzureDiamond> awesome!
<AzureDiamond> wait, how do you know my pw?
<Cthon98> er, I just copy pasted YOUR *****'s and it appears to YOU as hunter2 cause its your pw
<AzureDiamond> oh, ok.

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0.0127 21066 quotes approved; 486 quotes pending

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


OpenPGP

Email encryption. For all operating systems. Standing the test of time.

↓ Get OpenPGP Software

OpenPGP is the most widely used email encryption standard. It is defined by the OpenPGP Working Group of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) as a Proposed Standard in [RFC 4880](#). OpenPGP was originally derived from the PGP software, created by [Phil Zimmermann](#).



img tfy LMGTFY x serena

Secure | <https://imgtfy.com/?q=how+to+use+pgp> ☆ ⋮

Step 1
Visit google.com

Step 2
Type your question.

Step 3
Click the button.

That's it!

google.com


Google

how to use pgp


Google Search I'm Feeling Lucky

Click Here

The above is an illustration for educational purposes.
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Shaming people is lazy



Obligatory xkcd: <https://xkcd.com/149/>

“I don’t care about security.”

–Everyone not watching Mr Robot right now

“I care!!!”

–Serena Chen, lone nerd screaming into the void

Chapter 1. Getting Started

GnuPG is a tool for secure communication. This chapter is a quick-start guide that covers the core functionality of GnuPG. This includes keypair creation, exchanging and verifying keys, encrypting and decrypting documents, and authenticating documents with digital signatures. It does not explain in detail the concepts behind public-key cryptography, encryption, and digital signatures. This is covered in Chapter 2. It also does not explain how to use GnuPG wisely. This is covered in Chapters 3 and 4.

GnuPG uses public-key cryptography so that users may communicate securely. In a public-key system, each user has a pair of keys consisting of a *private key* and a *public key*. A user's private key is kept secret; it need never be revealed. The public key may be given to anyone with whom the user wants to communicate. GnuPG uses a somewhat more sophisticated scheme in which a user has a primary keypair and then zero or more additional subordinate keypairs. The primary and subordinate keypairs are bundled to facilitate key management and the bundle can often be considered simply as one keypair.

Generating a new keypair

The command-line option `--gen-key` is used to create a new primary keypair.

```
alice# gpg --gen-key
gpg (GnuPG) 0.9.4; Copyright (C) 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This program comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY.
This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it
under certain conditions. See the file COPYING for details.
```

```
Please select what kind of key you want:
(1) DSA and ElGamal (default)
(2) DSA (sign only)
(4) ElGamal (sign and encrypt)
Your selection?
```




GnuPG is able to create several different types of keypairs, but a primary key must be capable of making signatures. There are therefore only three options. Option 1 actually creates two keypairs. A DSA keypair is the primary keypair usable only for making signatures. An ElGamal subordinate keypair is also created for encryption. Option 2 is similar but creates only a DSA keypair. Option 4[1] creates a single ElGamal keypair usable for both making signatures and performing encryption. In all cases it is possible to later add additional subkeys for encryption and signing. For most users the default option is fine.


You must also choose a key size. The size of a DSA key must be between 512 and 1024 bits, and an ElGamal key may be of any size. GnuPG, however, requires that keys be no smaller than 768 bits. Therefore, if Option 1 was chosen and you choose a keysize larger than 1024 bits, the ElGamal key will have the requested size, but the DSA key will be 1024 bits.

```
About to generate a new ELG-E keypair.
    minimum keysize is 768 bits
    default keysize is 1024 bits
    highest suggested keysize is 2048 bits
What keysize do you want? (1024)
```

The longer the key the more secure it is against brute-force attacks, but for almost all purposes the default keysize is adequate since it would be cheaper to circumvent the








Fast, simple,
secure.

Privacy that fits in your
pocket.

 Android

 iPhone

 Desktop



**Design thinking is another
tool in the problem solving
tool belt**

For your consideration:

1.

2.

3.

4.

For your consideration:

1. Paths of Least Resistance


- 2.

- 3.

- 4.

Paths of Least Resistance

Application Security




You Are Not Authorized For This Application

OK



Security Alert



Information you exchange with this site cannot be viewed or changed by others. However, there is a problem with the site's security certificate.

- ✗ The security certificate was issued by a company you have not chosen to trust. View the certificate to determine whether you want to trust the certifying authority.
- ✓ The security certificate date is valid.
- ✓ The security certificate has a valid name.

Do you want to proceed?

Yes

No


View Certificate...

To stop internet, press firmly





**Consider the
“secure by default”
principle**





Normalise security



Account info **Personal info** Identity Review & submit

Enter your phone number

Getting your phone number allows us to verify you are the only one who can log into your account.



Phone number

Back

Next

Group similar tasks

People are ~~lazy~~ efficient

**Align your goals with the
end user's goals**

Privacy error x Guest

← → ↻ **Not Secure** | <https://35.202.240.51:8800> ⋮



Your connection is not private


Attackers might be trying to steal your information from **35.202.240.51** (for example, passwords, messages, or credit cards). [Learn more](#)

NET::ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID


HIDE ADVANCED [Back to safety](#)

This server could not prove that it is **35.202.240.51**; its security certificate is not trusted by your computer's operating system. This may be caused by a misconfiguration or an attacker intercepting your connection.

[Proceed to 35.202.240.51 \(unsafe\)](#)




"I KNOW HOW TO INTERNET"




“I KNOW HOW TO INTERNET”

**—Serena Chen,
a Real Human Adult™**



“I KNOW HOW TO INTERNET”


**—Serena Chen,
a Real Human Adult™**




**Path of (Perceived) Least
Resistance**

**“Each false alarm reduces the credibility
of a warning system.”**


*–S. Breznitz and C. Wolf. The psychology of false alarms.
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, NJ, 1984*



**Shadow IT is a massive
vulnerability**



COMPUTER PASS:
abc123



alison 3/23/16

password:

hunter2



Illustration by Megan Pendergrass

Fixing bad paths

- Use security tools for *security concerns*, not management concerns
- If you block enough non-threats, people will get really good at subverting your security

Building good paths

- Don't make me think!
- Make the secure path the easiest path
- e.g. BeyondCorp model at Google

“We designed our tools so that the user-facing components are **clear and easy to use. [...] For the vast majority of users, BeyondCorp is **completely invisible**.**

*–V. M. Escobedo, F. Zyzniewski, B. (A. E.) Beyer, M. Saltonstall,
“BeyondCorp: The User Experience”, Login, 2017*



**Align your goals with the
end user's goals**

For your consideration:

1. Paths of Least Resistance

- 2.

- 3.


- 4.

For your consideration:

1. Paths of Least Resistance
2. Intent
- 3.
- 4.

Intent

**Tension between usability
and security happens when
we cannot accurately
determine intent.**



“make it easy”



“lock it down”

**It is not our job to make
everything easy**

**It is not our job to make
everything locked down**

Our job is to make a specific **action**


- that a specific **user** wants to take
- at that specific **time**
- in that specific **place**


...easy

Everything else we can lock down.

**Knowing intent = usability
and security without
compromise**









For your consideration:

- 1. Paths of Least Resistance**
- 2. Intent**
- 3.**
- 4.**


For your consideration:

- 1. Paths of Least Resistance**
- 2. Intent**
- 3. (Mis)communication**
- 4.**


(Mis)communication

**Wherever there is a
miscommunication, there
exists a human security
vulnerability.**

**What are you
unintentionally
miscommuunicating?**



**Wherever there is a
miscommunication, there
exists a human security
vulnerability.**



iwantmyname

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A good domain name makes all the difference.

chase-help-and-support.com



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We believe in transparency, privacy, simplicity, community, and progressive employee policies.


[Inside iwantmyname](#)

QUICK LINKS

COMPANY

SUPPORT

EXTRAS



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Let's Encrypt is a **free, automated, and open** Certificate Authority.


Get Started Donate

FROM OUR BLOG

Apr 4, 2018
Engineering deep dive: Encoding of SCTs in certificates
How Signed Certificate Timestamps get embedded in

MAJOR SPONSORS AND DONORS





CONGRATS ON ANOTHER ONE! #StrengthInNumbers

Welcome

Username

Password

Remember me Use token >

Sign in


[Forgot username/password? >](#)

[Not enrolled? Sign up now. >](#)

Open an account

- Savings Accounts & CDs
- Checking Accounts
- Find a credit card
- Home Lending
- Car Buying & Loans





(I didn't actually do this)

Treatment of HTTPS pages

Current (Chrome 67)


 **Secure** | example.com

Sep. 2018 (Chrome 69)

 example.com

Eventually

example.com



**Do your end users know
what you're trying to communicate?**

**What is their mental model
of what's happening,
compared to yours?**

For your consideration:


1. Intent
2. Path of Least Resistance
3. (Mis)communication
- 4.




For your consideration:

1. Intent
2. Path of Least Resistance
3. (Mis)communication
4. Mental model matching

Mental models

**It's the user's expectations
that define whether a
system is secure or not.**





“A system is secure from a given user’s perspective if the set of actions that each actor can do are bounded by what the user believes it can do.”

*–Ka-Ping Yee, “User Interaction Design for Secure Systems”,
Proc. 4th Int’l Conf. Information and Communications Security, Springer-Verlag, 2002*

**Find their model,
match to that**

+

**Influence their model,
match to system**

Find their model



- Go to customer sessions!
- Observe end users
- Infer intent through context

Influence their model

- When we make, we teach
- Whenever someone interacts with us / a thing we made, they learn.
- Path of least resistance becomes the default “way to do things”.


**How are we already
influencing users' models?**

iOS



Phish


What are we teaching?



“I KNOW HOW TO INTERNET”

**—Serena Chen,
a Real Human Adult™**


Application Security



You Are Not Authorized For This Application

OK

**Understand end user
mental models**



**What are your users'
mental models?**

Review



Takeaways

- Cross pollination is rare. This is a missed opportunity!
- Our jobs are about *outcomes* based on our specific goals
- Align the user's goals to your security goals

Takeaways

- Aim to know their intent
- Collaborate with design to craft secure paths of least resistance
- Understand their mental model vs yours
- Communicate to that model

One final anecdote...

No!





Thanks!

Fight me @Sereena